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Abstract
In the industrialized world the population is aging over time, reduc-
ing the fraction of the population in working age. Consequently labor
is expected to be scarce, relative to capital, with an ensuing decline in
the real return on capital. This paper uses demographic projections to-
gether with a large scale multi-country Overlapping Generations Model
with uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty to quantify the distributional
and welfare consequences of these changes in factor prices induced by the
demographic transition.
In our model capital can freely flow between different regions in the
OECD (the U.S., the EU and the rest of the OECD). Thus international
capital flows may in principle mitigate the decline in rates of returns one
would expect in the U.S. if it were a closed economy.
We find exactly the opposite. In the U.S. as an open economy, rates
of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and
2080. If the U.S. were a closed economy, this decline would amount to
only 78 basis points. This result is due to the fact that other regions in
the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing”
the more severe aging problem from these regions, especially Europe. A
similar conclusion is reached if we let capital flow freely between the OECD
and the rest of the world (ROW). While ROW currently has a younger
population structure, it is predicted to age even more severely in the next
decades, giving rise to an even more pronounced decline in world rates of
return to capital.
∗We thank participants of seminars at the LSE, the Ente Einaudi, MEA and the 2005
Cleveland FED International Macroeconomics conference for many useful comments. The
authors can be reached at dirk.krueger@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de and alexander.ludwig@mea.uni-
mannheim.de. This paper was prepared for the Spring 2006 Carnegie-Rochester Conference
on Public Policy.
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In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic tran-
sition we ask the following hypothetical question: suppose a household
economically born in 2005 would live through the economic transition with
changing factor prices induced by the demographic change (but keeping
her own survival probabilities constant at their 2005 values), how would
its welfare have changed, relative to a situation without a demographic
transition? We find that households experience significant welfare losses
due to the demographic transition, in the order of 2−5% of consumption,
depending on their initial productivity level and the design of the pension
system. These losses are mainly due to the fact that lower future returns
to capital make it harder for households to save for retirement. On the
other hand, if the OECD suddenly opens up to ROW in 2005 and ROW
has higher returns to capital before the world capital market integration,
then these losses are reduced to 1.5− 2.5%.
JEL Classification: E17, E25, D33, C68
Keywords: Population Aging, International Capital Flows, Distrib-
ution of Welfare
1 Introduction
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, over time reducing
the fraction of the population in working age. This process is driven by falling
mortality rates followed by a decline in birth rates, which reduces population
growth rates (and even turns it negative in some countries). While demographic
change occurs in almost all countries across the world, extent and timing differ
substantially. Europe and some Asian countries have almost passed the closing
stages of the demographic transition process while Latin America and Africa
are only at the beginning stages (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; United Nations,
2002).
Figure 1 (which is based on UN population projections) illustrates the differ-
ential impact of demographic change on population growth rates for the period
2000-2080 for four regions of the world that comprise the entire world and that
we will use throughout this paper: the U.S., the European Union (EU), the rest
of the OECD (ROECD) and the rest of the world (ROW). Population growth
rates are predicted to decline in all regions, but are positive in the U.S. and
in the ROW region throughout the 21st century, whereas they significantly fall
below zero in the EU in about 2016 and in ROECD in about 2042. As a conse-
quence, the population in the EU (the ROECD) starts shrinking in about 2016
(2042), whereas the population in the other two regions continues to increase.
Figure 2 shows the impact of demographic change on working-age population
ratios - the ratios of the working-age population (of age 20-64) to the total
population (of age 20-95). This indicator, which will turn out to be crucial
in our analysis) illustrates that the EU is the oldest, whereas the ROW is the
youngest region in terms of the relative size of the working-age population.
The United States and the rest of the OECD region initially have the same
level of working-age population ratios, but the dynamics of demographic change
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Figure 1: Evolution of the Population Growth Rate in 4 Regions
differ substantially in the U.S. relative to the other regions. While working-
age population ratios decrease across all regions, the speed of this decrease
significantly slows down for the U.S. in about 2030.
What are the welfare consequences of living in a world where the population
is aging rapidly? First, individuals live longer lives and tend to have fewer
children, which are the underlying reasons of aging populations. The welfare
effects of these changes are hard to quantify. Second, due to changes in the
population structure, aggregate labor supply and aggregate savings is bound to
change, with ensuing changes in factor prices for labor and capital. Specifically,
labor is expected to be scarce, relative to capital, with an ensuing decline in the
real return on capital. The primary objective of this paper is to quantify the
distributional and welfare consequences from this second, general equilibrium
effect of the demographic changes around the world.
To this end, we use demographic projections from the United Nations, to-
gether with a large scale Overlapping Generations Model pioneered by Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987). We extend the model to a multi-country version, as in
Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) and many others, and also enrich the model by unin-
surable idiosyncratic uncertainty, as in Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Imrohoroglu
et al. (1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999) and many others. Both extensions
of the basic Auerbach-Kotlikoff model are necessary for the question we want
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Figure 2: Evolution of Working Age to Population Ratios in 4 Regions
to address. First, uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty will endogenously give
rise to some agents deriving most of their income from returns to capital, while
the income of others is mainly composed of labor income. Abstracting from
this heterogeneity does not allow a meaningful analysis of the distributional
consequences of changes in factor prices. This feature also adds a precautionary
savings motive to the standard life-cycle savings motive of households, which
makes life cycle profiles of consumption generated by the model more realistic.
Second, in light of potential differences in the evolution of the age distribution
of households across regions, it is important to allow for capital to flow across
regions. In our model capital can freely flow between different regions in the
OECD (the U.S., the EU and the rest of the OECD). Thus international capital
flows may in principle mitigate the decline in rates of return one would expect
in the U.S. if it were a closed economy.
We find exactly the opposite. In the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return
are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080. If the U.S.
were a closed economy, this decline would amount to only 78 basis points. This
result is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more
rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe aging problem from
these regions, especially Europe. A similar conclusion is reached if we let capital
flow freely between the OECD and the rest of the world (ROW). While ROW
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currently has a younger population structure, it is predicted to age even more
severely in the next decades (see again figure 2), giving rise to an even more
pronounced decline in world rates of return to capital.
In order to evaluate the welfare consequences of the demographic transition
we ask the following hypothetical question: suppose a household economically
born in 2005 would live through the economic transition with changing factor
prices induced by the demographic change (but keeping her own survival prob-
abilities constant at their 2005 values), how would its welfare have changed,
relative to a situation without a demographic transition? We find that house-
holds experience significant welfare losses due to the demographic transition, in
the order of 2−5% of consumption, depending on their initial productivity level
and on the design of social security systems. These losses are mainly due to the
fact that lower future returns to capital make it harder for households to save
for retirement. On the other hand, if the OECD suddenly opens up to ROW
in 2005 and ROW has higher returns to capital before the world capital market
integration, then these losses are reduced to 1.5− 2.5%.
Our paper borrows model elements from, and contributes to, three strands
of the literature. Starting with Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) a vast number of
papers has developed that uses large-scale OLG models to analyze the transition
path of an economy induced by a policy reform. Examples include social security
reform (see e.g. Conesa and Krueger (1999), fundamental tax reform (see e.g.
Altig et al. (2001), Conesa and Krueger (2005)) and many others.
A second strand of the literature (often using the general methodology of
the first strand) has focused on the economic consequences of population aging
in closed economies, often paying special attention to the adjustments required
in the social security system due to demographic shifts. Important examples
include Huang et al. (1997), De Nardi et al. (1999), and with respect to asset
prices, Abel (2003).
These contributions discussed so far assume that the economy under investi-
gation is closed to international capital flows. However, as the population ages
at different pace in various regions of the world one would expect capital to flow
across these regions. The third strand of the literature our paper touches upon
therefore is the large body of work in international macroeconomics studying the
direction, size, cause and consequences of international capital flows and cur-
rent account dynamics in a variety of models. This large literature is reviewed
comprehensively in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
Our paper is most closely related to work that combines these three strands of
the literature, by using the methodology of large scale OLG models to study the
consequences of demographic change in open economies. The work by Attanasio
et al. (2006b) constructs a two region (the North and the South) OLG model to
study the allocative and welfare consequences of different social security reforms
in an open economy. Compared to their model, we include endogenous labor
supply and idiosyncratic income shocks. While we also have to take a stand
on how the social security system deals with the aging of the population, these
social security reforms are not in the center of our analysis whereas their paper
focuses on this issue. In Attanasio et al. (2006a) the authors quantify the direct
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welfare losses from demographic changes for the South region of their model,
carrying out a similar thought experiment we do for the U.S. Their qualitative
and quantitative results are consistent with the findings of our paper.
Similar to Attanasio et al. (2006b), but with a stronger focus on Europe or
the OECD, Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) and Fehr et al. (2005) investigate the
impact of population aging on the viability of the social security system and its
reform. Building on earlier work by Brooks (2003) who employs a simple four
period OLG model, Henriksen (2002), Feroli (2003) and Domeij and Floden
(2005) use large scale simulation models similar to Attanasio et al. (2006a,
b) to explain historical capital flow data with changes in demographics, rather
than, as we do, to study the (welfare and distributional) implications of future
changes in demographics. Relative to this literature, we see the contribution of
our paper in evaluating the welfare consequences of the demographic transition
(with focus on the U.S.) per se (and not just the alternative social security
reform scenarios), as well as in the analysis of the distributional consequences
of changing factor prices due to population aging.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we construct a simple,
analytically tractable multi-country OLG model to isolate the key determinants
of the direction of international capital flows and the impact of changes in the
demographic structure on rates of return and capital flows. Section 3 contains
the description of our large scale simulation model, including the definition of
competitive equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model and
section 5 presents results for the benchmark model. In section 6 we document
the sensitivity of our results with respect to our assumptions about the regions
between which capital can flow freely, and we also show that ignoring endogenous
labor supply responses to factor price changes may result in biased predictions of
the model. Section 7 concludes, and separate appendices contain more detailed
information about the demographic model underlying our simulations, as well
as details of the computational strategy and calibration of the model.
2 A Simple Model
In this section we construct a simple OLG model that is a special case of our
quantitative model in the next section. We can characterize equilibria in this
model analytically, and are especially interested in the influence of demographic
variables and the size and structure of the social security system on rates of
return to capital and the direction and dynamics of international capital flows.
The results of the simple model along these dimensions will provide some intu-
ition for the quantitative results from the simulation model.
In every country i there are Nt,i young households that live for two periods
and have preferences over consumption cyt,i, c
o
t+1,i representable by the utility
function
log(cyt,i) + β log(c
o
t+1,i)
In the first period of their lives households work for a wage wt,i, and in the
second period they retire and receive social security benefits bt+1,i that are
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financed via payroll taxes on labor income. Thus the budget constraints read
as
cyt + st = (1− τ t,i)wt,i
cot+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + bt+1,i
where rt+1 is the real interest rate between period t and t + 1 and τ t,i is the
social security tax rate in country i. We assume that capital flows freely across
countries, and thus the real interest rate is equalized across the world.
The production function in each country is given by
Yt,i = K
α
t,i (ZiAtNt,i)
1−α ,
where Zi is the country-specific technology level and At = (1+g)t is exogenously
growing productivity. Thus we allow for differences in technology levels across
countries, but not its growth rate. We further assume that capital depreciates
fully after use in production.
The production technology in each country is operated by a representative
firm that behaves competitively in product and factor markets. Profit maxi-
mization of firms therefore implies that
1 + rt = αk
α−1
t
wt,i = (1− α)ZiAtkαt , (1)
where
kt = kt,i =
Kt,i
ZiAtNt,i
∀i
is the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor.
We assume that the social security system is a pure pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system that balances the budget in every period. Therefore
τ t,iwt,iNt,i = bt,iNt−1,i
Finally, market clearing in the world capital market requires that
Kt+1 =
X
i
Kt+1,i =
X
i
Nt,ist,i
2.1 Analysis
Equilibria in this model can be characterized analytically. For that purpose we
first solve the household problem and then aggregate across households (coun-
tries).
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2.1.1 Optimal Household Savings Behavior
From the household problem we can solve for saving of the young in country i
as
st,i =
β
1 + β
wt,i(1− τ t,i)−
bt+1,i
(1 + β)(1 + rt+1)
(2)
The budget constraint of the social security system implies that
bt,i =
Nt,i
Nt−1,i
wtτ t,i = γNt,iwt,iτ t,i
where γNt,i is the gross growth rate of the young cohort in country i between
period t − 1 and t. It also measures the working age to population ratio (the
higher is γNt,i, the higher is that ratio) in this model
1, which allows us to map
the predictions of this model back to the data, plotted in figure 2. Using this
expression for benefits and substituting out for wages and interest rates from
(1) in (2) yields
st,i =
β(1− τ t,i)(1− α)
1 + β
ZiAtk
α
t −
γNt+1,iτ t+1,i(1− α)
(1 + β)α
ZiAt+1kt+1 (3)
2.1.2 Aggregation
For further reference, define by N˜t =
P
i ZiNt,i the efficiency weighted world
population, by θ˜t,i =
ZiNt,i
N˜t
=
N˜t,i
N˜t
the relative share of the efficiency-weighted
population in country i and by γ˜Nt =
N˜t
N˜t−1
=
P
i θ˜t,iγ
N
t,i the growth rate of
aggregate (world) efficiency weighted population.
The capital market clearing condition readsX
i
st,iNt,i =
X
i
Kt+1,i = kt+1
X
i
ZiAt+1Nt+1,i = kt+1At+1N˜t+1 (4)
1The population of a country i at time t is given by
Popt,i = Nt,i +Nt−1,i
and the working age to population ratio is given by
waprt,i =
Nt,i
Popt,i
.
The we can easily compute the growth rate of the population as
γPopt,i =
Popt+1,i
Popt,i
=
1 + γNt,i
1 + 1
γNt−1,i
In a steady state
γPopi = γ
N
i
Also waprt,i = 11+ 1
γNt,i
. Thus γNt,i measures both the population growth rate as well as the
working age to population ratio.
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Aggregating household savings decisions across countries yields, from (3):X
i
st,iNt,i =
(1− α)βAtkαt
1 + β
X
i
(1−τ t,i)ZiNt,i−
(1− α)At+1kt+1
(1 + β)α
X
i
ZiNt+1,iτ t+1,i
Using this in (4) and simplifying yields
kt+1 = σ(γ˜
N
t+1, γ
A, τat , τ
a
t+1)k
α
t (5)
where
σt = σ(γ˜
N
t+1, γ
A, τat , τ
a
t+1) =
=
α(1− α)β(1− τat )
γ˜Nt+1γA
¡
α(1 + β) + (1− α)τat+1
¢
is the world aggregate saving rate of the economy in period t, with τat =P
i τ t,iθ˜t,i denoting the average social security contribution rate in the world
and γA = 1 + g is the growth rate of the technology.
Equation (5), as a function of the policy and demographic parameters of the
model, describes the dynamics of the aggregate capital stock, given the initial
condition k0.2 As long as γ˜Nt+1γ
A ≥ 1, the economy converges monotonically
from its initial condition to a balanced growth path in which all per capita
variables grow at the rate g of technical progress.3
Since, from the firms’ first order condition, interest rates are given by
1 + rt = αk
α−1
t
the dynamics of the real interest rate are given by
1 + rt+1 =
µ
α
σt
¶1−α
(1 + rt)
α (6)
with initial condition 1 + r0 = αk
α−1
0 .
Finally, we can characterize international capital flows. Net foreign assets of
country i at the beginning of period t+ 1 (or the end of period t) are given by
Ft+1,i = Nt,ist,i −Kt+1,i = Nt,ist,i − ZiAt+1Nt+1,ikt+1
Thus, after some tedious algebra, and using (3) yields
Ft+1,i
Yt,i
=
µ
(1− α)β(1− τ t,i)
1 + β
− γNt+1,iγAσt
µ
1 +
τ t+1,i(1− α)
(1 + β)α
¶¶
= ft+1,i(γNt+1,i, γ
A, τ t,i, τ t+1,i, γ˜N,t+1, τ
a
t , τ
a
t+1) (7)
as the net foreign asset to GDP ratio of country i.4
2Explicitly, k0 =
P
i s−1,iN−1,i
A0
P
i ZiN0,i
where s−1,iN−1,i denotes total assets held by the initial
old generation in country i.
3This is a sufficient, but by no means necessary condition.
4Furthermore, the current account, relative to output, is defined as
cat,i =
CAt,i
Yt,i
=
Ft+1,i − Ft,i
Yt,i
= ft+1,i − ft,i/γYt,i (8)
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2.2 Qualitative Results
In this section we illustrate how changes in demographics, or changes in the
social security system (induced by demographic changes) affect both world-wide
rates of return and net foreign asset positions of different countries.
2.2.1 Dynamics in Rates of Return
What are the effects of an (unexpected, but permanent) decline in the working
age to population ratio in period t? Since kt and hence rt is predetermined, we
observe from (6) that the response of rt+1 depends negatively on the world
saving rate σt, which is itself a negative function of the efficiency-weighted
population growth rate γ˜Nt+1 between period t and t + 1 (which can also be
interpreted as a measure of the worldwide working age to population ratio).
Evidently a decline in γ˜Nt+1 increases the world-wide saving rate σt, which in
turn reduces the rate of return rt+1 tomorrow.5
Another interesting, and possibly somewhat unexpected observation from
(6) pertains to the potential indirect consequences from population aging via
the social security system. The aggregate saving rate σt depends negatively
on the size of the social security system, as measured by its (world average)
contribution rate τa. If the population ages and if policy makers want to keep
social security benefits stable, this requires an increase in contribution rates. But
such an increase, according to our simple model reduces σt and thus increases
future rates of return. This effect may mitigate or even dominate the direct
effect of population aging on rates of return, as also highlighted by Fehr et al.
(2005).
To summarize, a decline in the world-wide working age to population ratio
(as approximated by γ˜N ) leads to a decline in rates of return to capital, as
long as social security contribution rates are held constant (and thus benefits
shrink). If, however, contribution rates are raised in addition, to keep social
security benefits stable, the predicted decline in returns is smaller, or returns
may even increase. Quantitative work is needed to measure the relative strength
of these effects, something we will turn to in the next sections of this paper.6
where γYt,i =
Yt,i
Yt−1,i
= γAt γ
N
t,i
³
σt−1k
α−1
t−1
´α
is the growth rate of output in country i.
5The future dynamics of rates of return can then be read off from (6), with στ being
constant for τ > t and returns converging monotonically to the lower steady state level
associated with the lower γ˜N .
6For the case that τ t,i = τ t+1,i = 0 one can also derive a simple expression for the welfare
consequences of a decline in γ˜Nt+1. In that case lifetime utility of an agent born in t is given
by
ut = κ+ (1 + β) log(wt,i) + β log(1 + rt+1).
In response to a decline in γ˜Nt+1 wages wt,i do not change (since it depends kt which is
predetermined at time t), but reduces 1 + rt+1, leading to an unambiguous welfare loss for
generation t.
For future generations the welfare consequences depend on the relative magnitudes of
declines in rates of return and increases in wages. One can show that the lower is α, the
stronger is the response of interest rates, relative to wages, and thus the more unfavorable are
the welfare consequences from a decline in γ˜N . On the other hand, the higher is β, the more
10
2.2.2 Net Foreign Asset Positions
Finally we want to deduce the implications of the simple model for the sign and
dynamics of net foreign asset positions across countries. While it is possible
to derive these implications in general, it is cleanest and most instructive for
intuition to focus on balanced growth paths in which the economy is growing at
rate γNγA and where the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor is given as
k∗ = (σ∗)
1
1−α =
µ
α(1− α)β(1− τa)
γ˜NγA (α(1 + β) + (1− α)τa)
¶ 1
1−α
Evidently the steady state capital stock per labor efficiency units is strictly
decreasing in the effective population growth rate of the world, γ˜N as well as
the average social security contribution rate of the world economy, τa. The
reverse is true for the world interest rate.
Along the balanced growth path, net foreign asset positions of country i are
given by7
fi =
β(1− α)(1− τ i)
1 + β
∙
1− γ˜
N
i (1− τa)(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τ i)
γ˜N (1− τ i)(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τa)
¸
Thus our simple model has the following qualitative predictions for net asset
positions.8 First, if all countries have identical population growth rates and
social security contribution rates γ˜Ni = γ˜
N and τ i = τa), then net asset positions
and current accounts are zero in the long run. Second, if all countries have the
same size of the social security system (τ i = τa), then
fi =
β(1− α)(1− τ i)
1 + β
∙
1− γ˜
N
i
γ˜N
¸
Therefore countries with higher than world average working age to population
ratios have a negative net asset position and countries with lower than world
average working age to population ratios have positive net asset positions. Cap-
ital flows from old to young regions. While the steady state assumption makes
it tricky to discuss the dynamics of net asset positions within the model, we
would still expect that countries whose working age to population ratios decline
faster (slower) than others experience an increase (decline) in the net foreign
asset position.9
important are interest rate changes for welfare, and thus the higher β, the more unfavorable
are the welfare effects from a decline in γ˜N .
7We made use of the fact that N˜t,i = ZiNt,i and thus γ˜Ni = γ
N
i
8 In the empirically relevant case that γ˜Ni γ
A > 1, the sign of the current account coincides
with that of the net foreign asset position, since the former is given by
cai = fi
µ
1−
³
γ˜Ni γ
A
´−1¶
9 Strictly speaking, an increase in γ˜Ni or τ i changes τ
a as well. This is meant by ceteris
paribus. Also note that, with country heterogeneity in γ˜Ni , in the long run, almost the entire
world population is concentrated in the country with the highest γ˜Ni , but that per-capita
variables are still well-defined in all other countries as well.
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Finally, if all countries have identical working age to population ratios (γ˜Ni =
γ˜N ) then
fi =
β(1− α)(1− τ i)
1 + β
∙
1− (1− τ
a)(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τ i)
(1− τ i)(α(1 + β) + (1− α)τa)
¸
and countries with higher than average social security contribution rates, τ i >
τa have negative net asset positions and those with lower contribution rates
have positive net asset positions and current accounts.
We will again use these qualitative predictions from the simple model to
interpret our results from the quantitative model to which we turn next.
3 The Quantitative Model
In this section we describe the quantitative model we use to evaluate the con-
sequences of demographic changes around the world for international capital
flows, for the returns to capital and wages, as well as the welfare consequences
emanating from these changes. In our quantitative work we consider (at most)
four countries/regions: the United States (U.S.), the European Union (EU), the
rest of the OECD (ROECD) and the rest of the world (ROW).
3.1 Demographics
The demographic evolution in the countries of interest is taken as exogenous
(that is, we do not model fertility, mortality or migration endogenously) and is
the main driving force of our model. Households start their economic life at age
20 retire at age 65 and life at most until age 95. Since we do not model the first
19 years of a household explicitly, we denote its twentieth year of life by j = 0
its retirement age by jr = 45 and the terminal age of life by J = 75. Households
face an idiosyncratic, time- and country-dependent (conditional) probability to
survive from age j to age j + 1 which we denote by st,j,i.
For each country i ∈ {1, . . . , I} we have data or forecasts for populations
of model age j ∈ {0, . . . , 75} in years 1950, . . . , 2300. In the remainder of the
paper, we denote year 1950 as our base year t = 0 and year 2300 as the final
period T and the demographic data for periods t ∈ {0, . . . , T} by Nt,j,i. For
simplicity, we assume that all migration takes place at or before age j = 0 in
the model, so that we can treat migrants and agents born inside the country
of interest symmetrically. The law of motion of the demographic data for age
j ≥ 0 is accordingly given by
Nt+1,j+1,i = st,j,iNt,j,i
3.2 Technology
In each country the single consumption good is being produced according to a
standard neoclassical production function
Yt,i = ZiK
α
t,i (AtLt,i)
1−α
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where Yt,i is output in country i at date t, Kt,i and Lt,i are labor and capital
inputs and At is total labor productivity, growing at a constant rate, g, which
is the same across countries. Zi denotes total factor productivity in country i
which scales countries by their average levels of productivity. The parameter α
measures the capital share and is assumed to be constant over time and across
countries. Furthermore, in each country, capital used in production depreci-
ates at a rate δ, again assumed to be time- and country-independent. Since
production takes place with a constant-returns to scale production function in
each country and since we assume perfect competition, the number of firms is
indeterminate in equilibrium and, without loss of generality, we assume that a
single representative firm operates within each country.
3.3 Endowments and Preferences
Households value consumption and leisure over the life cycle {cj , 1−lj} according
to a standard time-separable utility function
E
⎧
⎨
⎩
JX
j=0
βju(cj , 1− lj)
⎫
⎬
⎭ ,
where β is the raw time discount factor and expectations are taken over idio-
syncratic mortality shocks and stochastic labor productivity.
Households are heterogenous with respect to age, a deterministic earnings
potential and stochastic labor productivity. All these sources of heterogeneity
affect a household’s labor productivity and thus wages. First, households labor
productivity differs according to their age. Let εj denote average age-specific
productivity of cohort j. Second, each household belongs to a particular group
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} that shares the same average productivity θk. Differences in
groups stand in for differences in education or ability, characteristics that are
fixed at entry into the labor market and affect a group’s relative wage. We in-
troduce these differences in order to generate part of the cross-sectional income
and thus wealth dispersion that does not come from our last source of hetero-
geneity, idiosyncratic productivity shocks. That is, lastly, a household’s labor
productivity is affected by an idiosyncratic shock, η ∈ {1, . . . , E} that follows a
time-invariant Markov chain with transition probabilities
π(η0|η) > 0.
Let Π denote the unique invariant distribution associated with π. Therefore,
labor productivity of a household of age j in group k and with idiosyncratic
shock η is given by
θkεjη.
3.4 Government Policies
The government collects assets of households that die before age J and redis-
tributes them in a lump-sum fashion among the citizens of the country as ac-
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cidental bequests, ht,i (inheritances). Furthermore, we explore how our results
are affected by the presence and the design of a pure pay-as-you-go public pen-
sion system, whose taxes and benefits have to be adjusted to the demographic
changes in each country. This social security system is modelled as follows.
On the revenue side, households pay a flat payroll tax rate τ t,i on their labor
earnings. Retired households receive benefits, bt,k,i, that are assumed to depend
on the household type, θk, but are independent of the history of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. Pension benefits are therefore given by
bt,k,i = ρt,iθk(1− τ t,i)wt,i,
where ρt,i is the pension system’s net replacement rate.
We assume that the budget of the pension system is balanced at all times
such that taxes and benefits are related via the government budget constraint
by
τ t,iwt,iLt,i =
X
k
bt,k,i
X
j≤jr
Nt,j,k,i, (9)
where Nt,j,k,i denotes the size of the population at time t of age j and type k
in country i.
In our results section we distinguish between two different scenarios for the
future evolution of the social security system in different countries, one in which
taxes are held constant and replacement rates adjust accordingly, and vice versa.
The results from the simple model above suggests that our results will be sig-
nificantly affected by this modelling choice.
3.5 Market Structure
In each period there are spot markets for the consumption good, for labor and
for capital services. While the labor market is a national market where labor
demand and labor supply are equalized country by country, the markets for the
consumption good and capital services are international in that goods and cap-
ital can flow freely, and without any transaction costs, between countries. The
supply of capital stems from households in all countries who purchase capital as
assets in order to save for retirement and to smooth out idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks. The supply of consumption goods stems from the representative
firms in each country.
Again, as sensitivity analysis, we explore how the U.S. would be affected by
its demographic changes if it were a closed economy. In that exercise the capital
used by U.S. firms equals the assets that U.S. citizens accumulate for life cycle
and precautionary motives.
3.6 Equilibrium
Individual households, at the beginning of period t are indexed by their age j,
their group k, their country of origin i, their idiosyncratic productivity chock η,
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and their asset holdings a. Thus their maximization problem reads as
W (t, j, k, i, η, a) (10)
= max
c,a0,1−l
{u(c, 1− l) + βst,j,i
X
η0
π(η0|η)W (t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, a0)}
s.t. c+ a0 =
(
(1− τ t,i)wt,iθkεjηl + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j < jr
bt,k,i + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j ≥ jr
a0, c ≥ 0 and l ∈ [0, 1]
Here wt,i is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor and rt is the real interest
rate. We denote the cross-sectional measure of households in country i at time
t by Φt,i. We can then define a competitive equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1 Given initial capital stocks and distributions, {K0,i,Φ0,i}i∈I , a
competitive equilibrium are sequences of individual functions for the household,
{W (t, ·), c(t, ·), l(t, ·), a0(t, ·)}∞t=0, sequences of production plans for firms {Lt,i,Kt,i}∞t=0,i∈I ,
policies {τ t,i, ρt,i, bt,i}∞t=0,i∈I , prices {wt,i, rt}∞t=0,i∈I , transfers {ht,i}∞t=0,i∈I and
measures {Φt,i}∞t=0,i∈I such that
1. Given prices, transfers and initial conditions, W (t, ·) solves equation (12),
and c(t, ·), l(t, ·), a0(t, ·) are the associated policy functions.
2. Interest rates and wages satisfy
rt = αZi
µ
Kt,i
AtLt,i
¶α−1
− δ
wt,i = (1− α)ZiAt
µ
Kt,i
AtLt,i
¶α
3. Transfers are given by
ht+1,i =
R
(1− st,j,i)a0(t, j, k, i, η, a)Φt,i(dj × dk × dη × da)R
Φt+1,i(dj × dk × dη × da) (11)
4. Government policies satisfy (3.4) and (9) in every period
5. Market clearing
Lt,i =
Z
θkεjηl(t, j, k, i, η, a)Φt,i(dj × dk × dη × da) for all i
IX
i=1
Kt+1,i =
IX
i=1
Z
a0(t, j, k, i, η, a)Φt,i(dj × dk × dη × da)
IX
i=1
Z
c(t, j, k, i, η, a)Φt,i(dj × dk × dη × da) +
IX
i=1
Kt+1,i
=
IX
i=1
At,iK
α
t,iL
1−α
t,i + (1− δ)
IX
i=1
Kt,i
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6. Law of Motion for cross-sectional measures Φ: The cross-sectional mea-
sures evolve as
Φt+1,i(J×K×E×A) =
Z
Pt,i((j, k, η, a),J×K×E×A)Φt,i(dj×dk×dη×da)
where the Markov transition functions Pt,i are given by
Pt,i((j, k, η, a),J×K×E×A) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
π(η, E)st,j,i if a
0(t, j, k, i, η, a) ∈ A
k ∈ K, j + 1 ∈ J
0 else
and for newborns
Φt+1,i({1} × K × E ×A) = Nt+1,0,i ·
½
Π(E) if 0 ∈ A
0 else
Definition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which all
individual functions are constant over time and all aggregate variables grow at
a constant rate.
3.7 Thought Experiment and Computation
We use our model for the following thought experiment. We take as exoge-
nous driving process a time-varying demographic structure in all regions under
consideration. We allow country specific survival, fertility and migration rates
to change over time, inducing a demographic transition from an initial distri-
bution towards a final steady state population distribution that arises once all
time changes in these rates have been completed and the population structure
has settled down to its new steady state. Induced by this transition of the
population structure is a transition path of the economies of the model, both
in terms of aggregate variables as well as cross-sectional distributions of wealth
and welfare. Summary measures of these changes will provide us with answers
as to how the changes in the demographic structure of the economy, by changing
returns to capital and wages, impact the distribution of welfare over time and
across people in the economy.
The time line of our model is therefore as follows: we start computations
in year 1950 assuming an artificial initial steady state. We then use data for a
calibration period, 1950-2004, to determine several structural model parameters,
see section 4. We then report simulation results for our projection period from
2005-2080. However, we also solve the model for a phase-out period that lasts
until 2300 when a final steady state is reached. For given structural model
parameters we solve for the equilibrium using a modification of the familiar
Gauss-Seidel algorithm (Ludwig, 2005a). Throughout we take as length of the
period one year. Appendix B contains a detailed description on how we solve
the household model for given prices and how we solve for aggregate equilibrium
quantities and prices over T = 350 years.
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4 Calibration
In this section we discuss how we specify the parameters for our benchmark
model. This entails choosing parameters governing the demographic transition,
the production technology by firms, the endowment and preference specification
of households and the social security policy.
4.1 Demographics
Our demographic data is based on the United Nations world population pro-
jections (United Nations, 2001). These population numbers determine both the
idiosyncratic survival probabilities as well as the relative sizes of total popu-
lations in the four countries/regions in all time periods under consideration.
Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction summarized the main stylized facts from
these population figures, and appendix A describes in detail the nature of our
demographic data and the methodology underlying our demographic projec-
tions.
4.2 Technology
With respect to the parameters of the production functions, we restrict the
capital share parameter, α, the growth rate of labor productivity, g, and the
depreciation rate, δ, to be constant across the four regions under consideration,
whereas we allow technology levels Zi to differ across regions. The parame-
ters of the production technologies in the different countries can accordingly be
collected as
~ΨPS = [α, g, δ, Z1, . . . , Z4]
0 .
We estimate parameters α, g and δ using U.S. NIPA data for a sample period
of 1950-2004, set Z1 = 1 and estimate Z2, . . . , Z4 taking data on relative labor
productivity across regions. A more detailed description of our approach is
given in appendix B.3. Table I summarizes the resulting parameter estimates
for the full model with four world regions.
Table I: Technology Parameters
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD ROW
Capital Share α 0.33
Growth Rate of Technology g 0.018
Depreciation Rate δ 0.04
Total Factor Productivity Zi 1.0 0.88 0.65 0.11
4.3 Endowments and Preferences
Households start their life with no assets and are endowed with one unit of time
per period. Labor productivity is given by the product of three components,
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a deterministic age component εj , a deterministic group component θk and a
stochastic idiosyncratic component η.
The age-productivity profile {εj}Jj=1 is taken from Hansen (1993) and gener-
ates an average life-cycle wage profile consistent with (U.S.) data. Conditional
on age, the natural logarithm of wages is given by
log(θk) + log(η).
We choose the number of groups to be K = 2 and let groups be of equal size.
We choose {θ1, θ2} such that average-group productivity is equal to 1 and the
variance of implied labor incomes of entrants to the labor market coincides
with that reported by Storesletten et al. (2004). This requires θ1 = 0.57
and θ2 = 1.43. For the idiosyncratic part of labor productivity we use a 2 state
Markov chain with annual persistence ρ = 0.98 and implied conditional variance
of 8%.
We assume that the within period utility function is of the familiar CRRA
form given by
u(c, l) =
1
1− σ
¡
cωi(1− l)1−ωi
¢1−σ
,
where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion and where ωi measures
the relative importance of consumption, relative to leisure in each country. Dif-
ferences in ωi across countries allow us to match simulated hours worked to the
actual data separately for each country. In addition we have to specify the time
discount factor of households which we restrict to be identical across countries.
The parameters of the household sector can accordingly be summarized as
~ΨHS = [σ,β,ω1, . . . ,ω4]
0
.
We assume σ = 1 such that utility is separable between consumption and leisure,
and determine the value of the discount rate by matching the average simulated
capital-output ratio to U.S. data for the period 1950-2004. The consumption
share parameters ωi are estimated by matching simulated average hours worked
in the regions of our model to the data. A more detailed description of our
methodology is given in appendix B.3. Table II summarizes the parameters of
the household model for the version of our model where all regions are included,
labor supply is endogenous and where pension systems are present.10
Table II: Preference Parameters
Parameter U.S. EU ROECD ROW
Coefficient of RRA σ 1.0
Time Discount Factor β 0.9422
Consumption Share Parameter ωi 0.459 0.446 0.444 0.500
10Estimated parameter values for other alternative versions of our model used in the sensi-
tivity analysis are similar and available from the authors upon request. For each alternative
model all model parameters are recalibrated to match the same aggregate data described
above.
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4.4 Social Security System
Our benchmark model contains no social security system. The version of the
model used most prominently in our welfare calculations contains the PAYGO
social security system, uses historical data for social security tax rates in the
four regions of interest until 2004 and then freezes future contribution rates at
their 2004 levels. Benefits adjust to achieve budget balance. In the alternative
scenario of fixed replacement rates we again use historical region-specific data
on contribution rates to back out constructed replacement rates until 2004 and
then fix replacement rates in the future to their 2004 values. Tax rates adjust
(i.e. increase) to assure budget balance of the social security system.
Data for calibrating the social security system are taken from various sources.
For the U.S., we calculate social security contribution rates from NIPA data
taken from the BEA (Table 3.6). It is more difficult to obtain data for the other
world regions. We proxy the time path of social security contribution rates by
using time path information on total labor costs taken from the BLS and scale
these data by social security contribution rates from the OECD observed for
one year.
5 Results for the Benchmark Model
In order to isolate the direct effects of demographic changes on returns to cap-
ital, international capital flows, and the distribution of wealth and welfare we
first abstract from social security. In the presence of such a system demographic
changes necessitate reforms in either social security taxes or benefits, which in-
duce further changes on aggregate variables and distributions. We will quantify
these effects in section 5.4. In the benchmark scenario we also assume that
capital flows freely only between regions in the OECD, and we document in
section 6.1 how our results are affected if capital flows to the rest of the world
are permitted.
5.1 Aggregate Statistics
In figure 3 we display the evolution of the real return to capital from 2000 to
2080. In the same figure we plot, as a summary measure of the age structure
of the population, the fraction of the world population with age above 65 (by
assumption these agents are retired in our model); this statistic is one minus the
working age to population ratio. We observe that the rate of world-wide return
to capital is predicted to fall by about 1 percentage point in the next 60 years
and then to settle down at that lower level. This is exactly what we would have
expected, given the qualitative results from the simple model in section 2, and
given the fact that so far we abstract from social security (reform).
Given our production function, pre-tax wages are related to the interest rate
by
wt,i = (1− α)ZiAt
µ
αZi
rt + δ
¶ α
1−α
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Figure 3: Evolution of World Interest Rates
and thus de-trended (by productivity growth) real wages follow exactly the
inverse path of interest rates, as documented in figure 3. These de-trended
wages are predicted to increase by roughly 5% between 2000 and 2080 in all
regions in our model.
In figure 4 we plot the evolution of de-trended output per capita in the three
regions, normalized to 1 in the year 2000. We observe substantial declines of
7− 13% in the three regions. The decline is least pronounced in the U.S., since
there the decrease of the fraction of households in working age is more modest
after 2030, as we saw in figure 2.
5.2 Quantifying International Capital Flows
In order to document our results about the direction and size of international
capital flows we will document the evolution of the net asset position and the
current account of the countries/regions under consideration. Define the net
foreign asset position of country i at time t at the beginning of period t as
Ft,i = At,i −Kt,i
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The current account in period t is then defined as the change in the net asset
position of a country,
CAt,i = Ft+1,i − Ft,i
= (At+1,i −At,i)− (Kt+1,i −Kt,i)
= St,i − It,i
that is, the current account equals the difference between national savings and
domestic investment of a country.11 When reporting these statistics we always
divide them by output Yt,i.
We first plot, in figure 5, the net foreign asset position, relative to GDP,
in the three regions of our model. The European Union, as the oldest region,
has a positive net asset position and thus provides capital to both the rest
of the OECD and, increasingly, to the U.S., whose population is aging slowest.
11Note that in a closed economy Ft,i = Ct,i = 0, and that in a balanced growth path of an
open economy CAt,i = g (At,i −Kt,i) . Furthermore net asset positions and current accounts
evidently have to sum to 0 across regions:X
i
Ft,i =
X
i
CAt,i = 0 for all t.
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Figure 5: Evolution of the Net Foreign Asset Position in 3 Regions
especially in the years between 2020 and 2035 our model predicts massive capital
inflows into the U.S. and out of European Union and, especially, the rest of the
OECD. Again this is exactly in line with the predictions of the simple model,
coupled with the level and dynamics of the working age to population ratio in
these different regions, as documented in figure 2.
The current account of a country is simply the change in the net asset
position, and thus the derivative of the previous plots. Figure 6 shows very
clearly the deterioration of the current account of the U.S. that is expected to
occur in the next 30 years, as capital flows from the European Union and, with a
slight time delay, from the rest of the OECD, into the U.S. By 2040 this process
is completed and the current account of all countries returns to roughly 0 from
that point on.
A negative current account such as predicted for the U.S. in the next 40
years can be due to weak saving or strong investment in a country. In order to
disentangle the different effects of demographic changes on the current account,
in figures 7 and 8 we plot the evolution of region-specific saving rates St,iYt,i and
investment rates It,iYt,i over time.
The most direct effect of an aging population is that labor, as a factor of
production, becomes scarce. As a result, for unchanged aggregate saving the
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return to capital has to fall and gross wages have to rise. This is what we
observe in figure 3. However, the decline in interest rates reduces the incentives
of households to save. In addition, with the aging of society the age composition
of the population shifts towards older households, who are dis-savers in our life
cycle model. Consequently savings rates in all regions in our model decline over
time, as shown in figure 7. For the next 20 years the fall in savings rates is most
pronounced for the U.S., because there, during this time period, the large cohort
of baby boomers moves into retirement. The same is true for other regions of
the world, albeit to a lesser degree.
After the large cohort of baby boomers have left the economy (i.e. died)
the U.S. saving rate is predicted to rebound (in about 25 to 35 years) and then
to stabilize, whereas in the European Union and the rest of the OECD savings
rate continue to fall until about 2040 and then stabilize.
The other side of the medal (that is, of the current account) is the investment
behavior in the different regions. Given that savings rates decline globally due
to population aging investment rates have to do so as well (at least on average),
since the world current account has to balance to 0. Figure 8 demonstrates this
fall for all regions, but also shows that the fall is by far the least pronounced
for the U.S. Furthermore, in the U.S. the investment rate stops to fall by about
2020, roughly a decade earlier than its saving rate. This is due to the fact that
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Figure 7: Evolution of Net Saving Saving Rate in 3 Regions
the fall in the working age to population ratio is more or less completed around
that date in the U.S. On the other hand, in the EU and the rest of the OECD
this ratio continues to fall until 2035. Since capital-(effective) labor ratios have
to be equalized, capital allocated to these regions has to fall (relative to the
U.S.) and so do investment rates in these regions. As a consequence we observe
the large deterioration of the current account in the U.S. of about 2% of GDP
around 2025.
5.3 Distributional and Welfare Consequences of Demo-
graphic Change
In the previous sections we have documented substantial changes in factor prices
induced by the aging of the population, amounting to a decline of about 1
percentage point in real returns to capital and an increase in gross wages of about
5% in the next decades. In this section we want to quantify the distributional
and welfare effects emanating from these changes.
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5.3.1 Evolution of Inequality
In figure 9 we display the evolution of income inequality over time in the three
regions. Income is composed of labor income (which later will include pension
income) and capital income as well as transfers from accidental bequests. We
observe a significant increase in income inequality between 2000 and 2080, of
about 5 points in the Gini coefficient for the EU and the ROECD and 3.5 points
in the U.S.. The reason for this increase is mainly a compositional effect. Retired
households have significantly lower income on average than households in work-
ing age. The demographic transition towards more retired households therefore
is bound to increase inequality, especially in those regions where the increase
in the fraction of retired households among the population is very pronounced.
This explains the more modest increase in income inequality in the U.S.. Note
that consumption inequality follows income inequality trends fairly closely in
the three regions (and thus is not shown here), but increases in consumption
inequality are less pronounced. Also notice that the ordering of countries in the
figure will be reversed once we add pension systems - then, income will be least
equally distributed in the U.S..
The fact that it is not a rise in capital income inequality that drives the in-
crease in total income inequality becomes clear when plotting wealth inequality
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Figure 9: Evolution of Income Inequality in 3 Regions
over time. There is no discernible increase in the same period; evidently the
same is true for capital income inequality since capital income is proportional
to wealth.
In contrast to income, wealth follows a hump-shaped pattern over the life
cycle (on average), with the elderly and the young being wealth-poor. Thus,
in contrast to income inequality, the aging of the population does not lead to
an increase in wealth inequality, since the demographic change increases the
fraction of the elderly, but reduces the fraction of the young. Consequently
income and wealth inequality do not follow the same trend over time (nor is the
ranking in inequality across regions the same for income and wealth).
5.3.2 Welfare Consequences of the Demographic Transition
A household’s welfare is affected by two consequences of the demographic change.
First, her lifetime utility changes because her own survival probabilities increase;
this is in part what triggers the aging of the population (the other source are
declines in birth rates). Second, due to the demographic transition she faces dif-
ferent factor prices and government transfers and taxes (from the social security
system and from accidental bequests) than without changes in the demographic
structure.
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Figure 10: Evolution of Wealth Inequality in 3 Regions
We want to isolate the welfare consequences of the second effect. For this we
compare lifetime utility of agents born and already alive in 2005 under two differ-
ent scenarios. For both scenarios we fix a household’s individual survival prob-
abilities at their 2005 values; of course they fully retain their age-dependence.
Then we solve each household’s problem under two different assumptions about
factor prices (and later taxes/transfers, once we have introduced social security).
Let W (t, i, j, k, η, a) denote the lifetime utility of an agent at time t ≥ 2005 in
country i with individual characteristics (j, k, η, a) that faces the sequence of
equilibrium prices as documented in the previous section, but constant 2005
survival probabilities, and let W 2005(t, i, j, k, η, a) denote the lifetime utility of
the same agent that faces prices and taxes/transfers that are held constant at
their 2005 value. Finally, denote by g(t, i, j, k, η, a) the percentage increase in
consumption that needs to be given to an agent (t, i, j, k, η, a) at each date and
contingency in her remaining lifetime (keeping labor supply allocations fixed) at
fixed prices to make her as well off as under the situation with changing prices.12
12For the Cobb-Douglas utility specification for σ 6= 1 the number g(t, i, j, k, η, a) can easily
be computed as
g(t, i, j, k, η, a) =
"
W (t, i, j, k, η, a)
W 2005(t, i, j, k, η, a)
# 1
ωi(1−σ)
.
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Negative numbers of g(t, i, j, k, η, a) thus indicate that households suffer welfare
losses from the general equilibrium effects of the demographic changes.13 Of
particular interest are the numbers g(t = 2005, i, j = 1, k, η, a = 0), that is,
the welfare consequences for newborn agents in 2005 (remember that newborns
start their life with zero assets).
Table III documents the welfare consequences for newborns in all three re-
gions, differentiated by their type k and productivity shock η. We make several
observations. First, independent of country of origin, productivity type and
initial productivity shock newborn agents experience welfare losses from chang-
ing factor prices and transfers induced by the demographic transition. Apart
from changing preferences through higher longevity (an effect we control for
in our welfare calculations) the demographic transition substantially reduces
the interest rate, moderately increases wages and somewhat reduces transfers
from accidental bequests, at least eventually. The negative first and third ef-
fect dominate the second effect of higher wages, especially the need to save for
retirement at a lower interest rate, in the absence of social security, adversely
affects welfare.14
Table III: Welfare Consequences, Newborns
United States Eur. Union Rest OECD
η1 η2 η1 η2 η1 η2
k1 −5.3% −2.0% −5.4% −2.1% −5.0% −1.8%
k2 −5.2% −1.9% −5.3% −2.0% −4.9% −1.7%
Second, the welfare losses differ across household characteristics and coun-
tries. In the benchmark model without social security, cross-country differences
in welfare losses can only be due to country-specific changes in transfers from
accidental bequests, with more severe declines being associated with higher wel-
fare losses. Since transfers decline by 23% in the EU, but only by 20% and
12% in the U.S. and the rest of the OECD between 2005 and 2080, the welfare
losses are highest in the EU, followed by the U.S. and then ROECD. Since these
transfers are small in magnitude, however, so are the cross-country differences.
Absent social security, lump-sum transfers from accidental bequests are also the
only source of nonhomotheticity in the model. Since these transfers are less
important for high-productivity agents, their decline hurts them less and thus
the welfare losses are moderately smaller for k2 types than for k1 types. Again
the difference is small since transfers are.
Quantitatively more important are differences in welfare losses across sto-
chastic productivity shocks, which are significantly higher for agents starting
the labor market with low productivity. These agents are not permanently less
A similar expression holds for σ = 1.
13We also computed these numbers taking 1950 as the base year of comparison. The results
are available upon request.
14 If interest rates are held constant, the welfare consequences are indeed (significantly)
positive for all but the wealth-poorest who suffer from the decline in transfers.
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productive than their brothers, but given the persistent nature of the shocks
they will have to wait a while in expectation before becoming productive and
thus in a position to save for retirement. But this means that they have to save
for retirement at lower interest rates, since these are falling over time. Currently
productive agents, on the other hand, can take advantage of their currently high
labor income and start to accumulate assets at times in which returns are still
high. In addition to this effect, the eventual reduction in transfers again hurts
income-rich agents less than income-poor agents. Combining these effects re-
sults in welfare losses of currently poor young households that are substantially
higher.
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Figure 11: Welfare Consequences by Asset Levels
An advantage of our model with uninsurable idiosyncratic income shocks and
thus intra-cohort heterogeneity is that it allows us to document how the welfare
losses are distributed across the population, both across and within cohorts. To
demonstrate this by example, figure 11 plots the welfare losses for agents of age
60 in 2005. These households have most of their working life behind them, thus
are fairly unaffected by the wage changes, and simply experience lower returns
on their accumulated savings. While all households of that age group suffer
welfare losses, these losses differ substantially by accumulated asset levels, with
asset-rich households losing significantly more than asset-poor households.
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5.4 The Role of Social Security (and its Reform)
So far, we completely abstracted from government policies. While it is not clear
a priori what the interaction of demographic change and public policies are in
general, it is abundantly clear from policy debates that at least one large social
program is strongly affected by it: social security.
An idealized pay as you go public pension system can respond to an increase
in the share of pensioners in the population by (a combination of) two ways:
cutting benefits or increasing social security contribution rates. While a likely
response will include both elements, we now present results for the model with
a PAYGO social security system that responds to population aging by either
holding tax rates fixed (and thus cutting benefits), or by holding replacement
rates fixed (and thus raising taxes). Because of the strong influence of a public
pension system on private savings behavior, we expect that these different re-
form scenarios may have substantially different implications for the evolution of
factor prices and the size and direction of international capital flows as well as
the distribution of wealth and welfare. This conjecture turns out to be correct.
Note that for all exercises we re-calibrate production and preference parameters
such that each economy (with the different social security systems) attains the
same calibration targets for the 1950 to 2004 period
In table IV we show how the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates and
prices differs across different reform scenarios for social security. On the other
hand, keeping pension benefits constant has dramatic consequences for the evo-
lution of interest rates and wages, relative to the benchmark scenario of fixing
tax rates for social security. With fixed benefits the incentives to save for re-
tirement are drastically reduced, relative to the benchmark. In addition, the
substantial increase in tax rates and thus reduction in after tax wages makes it
harder to save. Therefore, despite the decline in the fraction of households in
working age (and diminished incentives to work because of higher payroll taxes)
now the capital-labor ratio remains roughly unchanged, because of the large
reduction of household savings. De-trended per capita GDP therefore declines
much more sharply under this reform scenario than under the benchmark of
fixed contribution rates.
Table IV. Evolution of Aggregates, 2005-208015
Var. No Soc.Sec. τ fixed ρ fixed
r −0.89% −0.86% −0.17%
w 4.4% 4.1% 0.8%
(1− τ)w 4.4% 4.1% −7.3%,−11.8%,−15.4%
Y/N −7.35%,−9.7%,−13.1% −7.1%,−9.2%,−12.6% −12.6%,−14.5%,−18.0%
Given these substantial differences it is not surprising that the welfare conse-
quences differ across these two scenarios as well. Table V summarizes the welfare
15The three numbers in each column of the last row refer to the three regions, the U.S., the
EU and the ROECD.
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losses from the demographic transition for newborns in the U.S. in 2005. The
main observation from the table is that, in contrast to fixed contribution rates
(may they be zero or positive) with fixed social security benefits welfare losses
are much more evenly shared by households with different productivity shocks.16
Social security, because of its progressive benefit schedule where benefits are im-
perfectly linked to contributions, redistributes from agents with currently high
productivity (also remember that the process is highly persistent) to households
with currently low productivity.
Table V: Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S.
No Soc.Sec. τ Fixed ρ Fixed
η1 η2 η1 η2 η1 η2
k1 −5.3% −2.0% −4.5% −1.8% −2.6% −2.5%
k2 −5.2% −1.9% −4.5% −2.0% −2.6% −2.6%
With fixed replacement rates and thus strongly increasing tax rates the mag-
nitude of this redistribution increases, which reduces the adverse welfare effects
from changing factor prices for η1 households and magnifies them for η2 house-
holds, relative to scenarios in which contribution rates and thus the size of the
social security system remain unchanged.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we further investigate the driving forces behind our results. In
particular, we discuss how our results hinge on our assumption of the U.S. being
open to international capital flows from (parts of) the rest of the world, and
we quantify the importance of modelling endogenous labor supply. Throughout
these exercises, pension systems are included.
6.1 The Importance of Free International Capital Flows
6.1.1 The U.S. as Closed Economy
Most analyses of the demographic transition and their allocative consequences
were carried out in a closed economy. We therefore want to quantify the impor-
tance of international capital flows for the extent to which the return to capital
in the U.S. responds to a change in its demographic structure. In order to do
so we now show results derived under the assumption that the U.S. is a closed
economy, and thus the capital stock used in its production has to be equal to
total domestic asset accumulation. For an interpretation of theses results it is
16Relative to a world without social security, now it is high productivity types that lose
slightly more from demographic shifts, since accidental bequests initially increase in the pres-
ence of social security. This effect is quantitatively small, however.
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important to keep in mind that, as figure 2 showed, if anything, the U.S. ages
more slowly than the EU and the rest of the OECD.
Table VI: Evolution of Aggregates, 2005-2080
Var. Open Economy Closed Economy
r −0.86% −0.78%
w 4.1% 3.7%
(1− τ)w 4.1% 3.7%
Y/N −7.1% −7.7%
Table VI shows that the U.S. imports the more pronounced population aging
from EU and rest of the world, in the sense that it experiences a more severe
decline in rates of return in the U.S. as open economy, compared to as closed
economy. Evidently wages follow the reverse pattern. Output per capita falls
less in the open economy because both labor input and capital used in U.S.
production decline by less between 2005 and 2080 than in the closed economy.
For capital, another way of stating this fact is that in the closed economy the
net foreign asset position of the U.S. is constant over time (and equal to zero),
whereas in the open economy it is declining over time, as more capital is flowing
into the U.S. (or less savings out of it) in 2080 than in 2005.
Measured by the decline in the return to capital, the U.S. therefore imports
some of the adverse effects of more pronounced aging of the population in Europe
and the rest of the OECD. Is this reflected in more negative welfare implications
as well? Table VII demonstrates that indeed not only does the U.S. import
negative consequences of population aging with respect to its rate of return,
but also with respect to the welfare of its households living through a time
where factor prices are changing due to changes in the demographic structure
around the world. Quantitatively, however, the additional losses from faster
aging societies elsewhere in the world are modest, in the order of about 0.3%
of lifetime consumption. Europe and the rest of the OECD is aging faster than
the U.S., but not to a vastly different degree.
Table VII: Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S.
Open Economy Closed Economy
η1 η2 η1 η2
k1 −4.5% −1.8% −4.2% −1.5%
k2 −4.5% −2.0% −4.3% −1.6%
6.1.2 Opening Up to the Rest of the World
So far we have assumed that while the U.S. is an open economy relative to
industrialized countries, capital is not flowing to developing countries, in our
model the set of countries not part of the OECD. While this is an assumption
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that does not describe the real world exactly, the lack of capital flows from rich
to poor countries has occupied such an influential literature that we took it as
our point of departure.
Figure 2 demonstrates that even though the rest of the world is younger
than OECD countries, it is expected to age faster in the next decades. Thus
the intuition that adding the rest of the world to our calculations will mitigate
the decline in the rate of return is flawed. In fact, repeating our thought ex-
periment with four world regions (the fourth region being the rest of the world,
ROW) delivers a decline in interest rates of about 1.04 percentage points (as
compared to 0.86 percentage points in our benchmark) and somewhat higher
welfare losses.17
These results do not imply, however, that there are no potential gains from
international capital flows when dealing with aging populations. We demon-
strate this with the following thought experiment: suppose until 2005 no capital
flowed between the OECD and the rest of the world, and then, in 2006, barriers
to international capital flows are suddenly (and unexpectedly) removed. Fur-
ther, suppose that the rate of return on capital is initially higher in ROW.18
Now capital flows from the OECD into ROW, making it scarcer in the OECD
and thus mitigates, at least initially, the decline in rates of returns in the OECD.
Table VIII quantifies the magnitude of these beneficial effects from opening
up the rest of the world to capital flows from the three regions of the OECD. It
is most informative to display the changes in prices between 2004 and 2005, and
between 2004 and 2030, since thereafter the changes in factor prices are nearly
identical across the two scenarios (the three region economy and the opening-up
scenario).
Table VIII. Evolution of Aggregates and Welfare (2005-80)
Variable 3 Region Scenario Opening Up Scenario
∆r2006−2005 −0.01% 0.14%
∆r2030−2005 −0.62% −0.47%
∆w2006−2005 0.06% −0.64%
∆w2030−2005 2.86% 2.71%
EV (k1) −4.5%,−1.8% −2.3%,−1.3%
EV (k2) −4.5%,−2.0% −2.5%,−1.6%
17The fourth region is aging fast, rapidly reducing the share of the population in the labor
force. In addition, it has only a small social security system, so that private savings are
crucial for retirement consumption. An increasing share of elderly in this region makes for
fairly stable national saving, further increasing the capital-labor share in the world economy.
18 Specifically, we proceed as follows: we first calibrate the three region economy exactly as
before. Now we assume that ROW has the same discount factor as the OECD regions and
compute the equilibrium for ROW as a closed economy, up until 2005, under the assumption
that all agents in the economy believe that ROW is closed to international capital flows forever.
Since the rest of the world is a younger region than the OECD, the capital-labor ratio is lower
there than in the OECD, and consequently rates of return to capital are higher. Then, in
2006, and unexpected for all agents the world opens up fully to international capital flows.
33
We observe that indeed rates of return are noticeably higher in the OECD
after having opened up to the rest of the world, relative to remaining closed,
for at least 30 years. The welfare losses (of newborns) from the demographic
transition are substantially mitigated in the U.S., especially for those agents
that would have suffered the most from interest rate declines in the near future
(the η1 households, the first welfare number in each row). The reduction in the
welfare losses of 0.5% to 2%, depending on the group, may be interpreted as
welfare gains from opening up the OECD to international capital flows with the
rest of the world.
6.2 The Role of Endogenous Labor Supply
With the exceptions of Börsch-Supan et al. (2005) and Fehr et al. (2005),
previous studies on the impact of demographic changes on rates of returns and
international capital flows have abstracted from endogenous labor supply re-
sponses to changing factor prices. As the aging of the population tends to
make labor scarce, and thus tends to drive up wages, it is likely that households
choose to work more, reducing the effect of demographic changes on factor prices
somewhat. In this subsection we want to quantify the importance of endogenous
labor supply responses for our results.
Table IX shows that, as expected, abstracting from endogenous labor supply
overstates the decline in real returns and output per capita to a substantial
degree.
Table IX. Evolution of Aggregates, 2005-2080
Var. Endog. Lab. Supply Exog. Lab. Supply
r −0.86% −1.09
w 4.1% 5.4%
(1− τ)w 4.1% 5.4%
Y/N −7.1%,−9.2%,−12.6% −10.2%,−14.2%,−15.9%
Consequently welfare losses from the demographic transition are more pro-
nounced if households are not permitted to adjust labor supply, as shown in
table X. This is the case especially for agents with currently high productivity
shock, η = η2. With endogenous labor supply, these agents take advantage of
rising wages and work more, while this is not optimal to do for η1 households.
Thus welfare losses get reduced more strongly for η2 agents when switching
from exogenous to endogenous labor supply. In addition, the decline in rates of
return is more severe in the exogenous labor supply scenario, and consequently
welfare losses are stronger for all groups.
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Table X: Welfare Consequences, Newborns in U.S.
Endog. Lab. Supply Exog. Lab. Supply
η1 η2 η1 η2
k1 −4.5% −1.8% −5.6% −3.9%
k2 −4.5% −2.0% −5.8% −4.2%
7 Conclusions
In all major industrialized countries the population is aging, bringing with it
a potentially large impact on the returns to the production factors capital and
labor. This paper has documented that the welfare consequences from the
declines in rates of return can be substantial, in the order of up to 5% in lifetime
consumption for newborns in 2005. Allowing capital to freely flow between the
OECD and the rest of the world may mitigate these costs substantially (but not
eliminate them), if returns to capital in the rest of the world are initially higher
than those in the OECD.
The welfare losses we document have to be traded off against the potential
welfare gains from a longer (and healthier) life that is part of the source of the
aging of the population in industrialized countries. While quantifying these wel-
fare gains is beyond the scope of the current paper, our results should evidently
not be interpreted as a statement that people living longer is a bad thing.
Another potentially beneficial side effect of a shrinking population (or a less
rapidly growing population) that we have abstracted from may emanate from a
reduction in the price of housing, assuming a supply that is at least somewhat
inelastic. Since a serious quantitative evaluation of this effect requires an ap-
propriate model of housing (choice) and thus the need of adding a continuous
state variable to our model, carrying out such an analysis is beyond the scope
of current computational feasibility, and thus left for future research.
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A Details of the Demographic Projections
For each country i ∈ {1, . . . , I} we base our demographic data on the official de-
mographic data and projections by the United Nations (United Nations, 2002).
Starting from a given initial age-distribution of population, N0,j¯,i, in year 1950
for actual age j¯ ∈ {0, . . . , 96} demography in each year t is given recursively by
Nt+1,j¯+1,i = Nt,j¯,i(st,j¯,i +mt,j¯,i), mt,j¯,i = 0 for j¯ > 19
Nt+1,0,i =
50X
j¯=15
ft,j¯,iNt,j¯,i
where mt,j¯,i(ft,j¯,i) denotes time, age and country specific migration (fertility)
rates. Our assumption, that migration rates are zero for ages above 19 allows us
to treat newborns and immigrants in the economic model alike, compare Section
3.1.
The United Nations provide demographic data on Nt,j¯,i, st,j¯,i and ft,j¯,i on
an annual basis for the years 1950-2050, but for age-groups of five only. We
interpolate the initial distribution of the population, N1950,j¯,i, and the data
on st,j¯,i and ft,j¯,i for all t ∈ {1950, . . . , 2050} between age-groups to get age-
specific data. As for migration we use the UN data on aggregate migration,
Mt,i, and assume that migration numbers are equally distributed across ages for
j¯ ∈ {0, . . . , 19}. These approximations result in a decent fit of our demographic
model to the official UN figures.
We further forecast demography beyond the UN forecasting horizon un-
til 2300. First, while holding fertility rates constant, we assume that life-
expectancy continues to increase at constant rates until year 2100. We then
hold age-specific survival rates constant and assume that fertility rates adjust
such that the number of newborns is constant in each successive year until
2200. This adjustment procedure implies that stationary population numbers
are reached in year 2200. To support the steady state in our economic model,
we hold demography constant for an additional 100 years until 2300.
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B Computational Details
B.1 Household Problem
The idea is to iterate on the Euler equation, using ideas developed in Carroll
(2005). The dynamic programming problem of the household reads as
W (t, j, k, i, η, a) (12)
= max
c,a0,1−l
{u(c, 1− l) + βst,j,i
X
η0
π(η0|η)W (t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, a0)}
s.t. c+ a0 =
(
(1− τ t,i)wt,iθkεjηl + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j < jr
bt,j,k,i + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j ≥ jr
a0, c ≥ 0 and l ∈ [0, 1]
where t indexes time, j indexes age, k indexes type, i indexes country, η denotes
the idiosyncratic income shock and a denotes asset holdings.
Following Deaton (1991), we denote by x “cash-on-hand” the maximum
amount of resources available,
x =
(
(1− τ t,i)wt,iθkεjη + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j < jr
bt,j,k,i + (1 + rt)(a+ ht,i) for j ≥ jr
Now, rewrite the Bellman equation as
V (t, j, k, , iη, x)
= max
c,1−l
{u(c, 1− l) + βst,j,i ·X
η0
π(η0|η)V (t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, (1 + rt+1) (x− c− θkεjηwt,i(1− τ t,i)(1− l)) + y0)},
where
y0 =
(
wt+1,i(1− τ t+1,i)θkεj+1η0 + (1 + rt+1)ht+1,i for j < jr
bt+1,j+1,k,i + (1 + rt+1)ht+1,i for j ≥ jr
The resulting inter-temporal Euler equation for consumption reads as
uc ≥ βst,j,i(1 + rt+1)
X
η0
π(η0|η)Vx0(t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, x0)
= if a0 > 0 (13)
and the intratemporal Euler equation for leisure as
u1−l ≥ βst,j,i(1 + rt+1)
X
η0
π(η0|η)Vx0(t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, x0)wt,i(1− τ t,i)θkεjη
= if l > 0 (14)
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and the envelope condition reads as
Vx(t, j, k, i, η, x) = u0(c) (15)
We can therefore define the intratemporal Euler equation between consump-
tion and leisure as
u1−l ≥ ucwt,i(1− τ t,i)θkεjη
= if l > 0 and a0 > 0 (16)
from which, for the family of Cobb-Douglas utility functions, we can get an
explicit solution for leisure in terms of consumption and wages as
1− l = 1− l (c,wt,i(1− τ t,i)θkεjη)
if l > 0 and a0 > 0 (17)
Our algorithm operates on (13),(15) and (17).
1. Define a type-independent grid for savings
GA = {0, a2, . . . , ana}
2. Define a type-dependent grid on x for the last generation
GSJ,k = {x1,k, . . . , xna,k}
Choose xnx > ana and x1 = xmin > 0, but small. Furthermore let nx =
na+ 1.
3. From economic theory it follows that
c(t, J, k, i, η, x) = x
l(t, J, k, i, η, x) = 0
a0(t, J, k, i, η, x) = 0
for all x ∈ GSJ,k. From (15)
V 0x0(t, J, k, i, η, x) = u
0
c(t, J, k, i, η, x)
Vx(t, J, k, i, η, x) = uc(t, J, k, i, η, x)
4. Now iterate on j, j = nj − 1, . . . , 1. Given that the function V 0x0(t+ 1, j +
1, k, i, η, x) is known from the previous step, do the following
(a) For all a0 ∈ GA, solve equation (13) for c using equation (17) for
numbers (c1, . . . , cna). Since
x0 /∈ GSj+1,k
in general, this involves interpolation of the function V . For reasons
of accuracy, we follow the suggestions of Carroll (2005) and interpo-
late on an appropriate transform of V 0 which is approximately linear.
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(b) Equipped with the consumption numbers, calculate leisure by solving
equation (17) for number (l1, . . . , lna).. If l < 0 then go back to (a)
and calculate consumption for l = 0.
(c) Equipped with the consumption and leisure numbers, define the grid
GSj,k by
x1 = xmin
xp+1 =
(
ap + cp + (1− lp)wt,i(1− τ t,i)θkεjη for j < jr
ap + cp + bt,j,k,i for j < jr
for p = 1, . . . , na
and the consumption functions
c(t, j, k, i, η, x1) = xmin
c(t, j, k, i, η, xp) = cp for p = 2, . . . , nx
l(t, j, k, i, η, xp) = lp for p = 1, . . . , nx
a(t, j, k, i, η, x1) = 0
a0(t, j, k, i, η, xp+1) = ap for p = 1, . . . , na
(d) Update for all x ∈ GSj,k
Vx(t, j, k, i, η, x)
= uc(c(t, j, k, i, η, x), 1− l(t, j, k, i, η, x))
V (t, j, k, i, η, x)
= u(c(t, j, k, i, η, x), 1− l(t, j, k, i, η, x)) + βst,j,iX
η0
π(η0|η)V (t+ 1, j + 1, k, i, η0, x0)
The updating of the value function again involves interpolation.
B.2 The Aggregate Model
For a given r× 1 vector ~Ψ of structural model parameters, we first solve for an
“artificial” initial steady state in period t = 0 which gives an initial distribution
of assets. We thereby presume that households assume prices to remain constant
for all periods t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and are then surprised by the actual price changes
induced by the transitional dynamics. Next, we solve for the final steady state
of our model which is reached in period T and supported by our demographic
projections, see Appendix A. For both steady states, we solve for the equilibrium
of the aggregate model by iterating on the m×1 steady state price vector ~Pss =
[p1, . . . , pm]
0. p1 is the world marginal product of capital, rt + δ, p2, . . . , pI+1
are social security contribution (or replacement) rates of each country, τ t,i(ρt,i),
and pI+2, . . . , p2I+1 are accidental bequests (as a ratio of wages) in each country,
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wt,i
. Notice that all elements of ~Pss are defined such that they are constant in
the steady states.
Solution for the steady states of the model involves the following steps:
1. In iteration q for guess ~P qss solve the household problem.
2. Next aggregate across all households in all countries to get the world-
wide aggregate capital stock,
P
iKt,i. Define by κt,i the capital stock per
efficiency unit in country i,
κt,i =
Kt,i
Z
1/(1−α)
i AtLt,i
= κt ∀i,
which is constant across all countries by our assumption of perfect capital
mobility and the market market clearing condition for the world interest
rate, rt + δ = ακ
α−1
t . It follows thatX
i
Kt,i = κt
X
i
Z
1/(1−α)
i AtLt,i.
We use this condition to form an update of the world marginal product of
capital, p˜1.
3. Aggregate across all households to get aggregate labor supply in each coun-
try, Lt,i. Update social security contributions (or replacement rates) using
the social security budget constraint, equation (9). Calculate bequests in
each country by equation (11).
4. Collect the updated variables in ~˜Pss and notice that ~˜Pss = H(~Pss), where
H is a vector-valued non-linear function.
5. Define the root-finding problem G(~Pss) = ~Pss − H(~Pss), where G is a
vector-valued non-linear function, and iterate on ~Pss until convergence.
We use Broyden’s method to solve the problem and denote the final ap-
proximate Jacobi matrix by Bss.
Next, we solve for the transitional dynamics by the following steps:
1. Use the steady state solutions to form a linear interpolation to get the
starting values for the m(T − 2) × 1 vector of equilibrium prices, ~P =
[~p01, . . . , ~p0m]
0, where pi, i = 1, . . . ,m are vectors of length (T − 2)× 1.
2. In iteration q for guess ~P q solve the household problem. We do so by
iterating backwards in time for t = T − 1, . . . , 2 to get the decision rules
and forward for t = 2, . . . , T − 1 for aggregation.
3. Update variables as in the steady state solutions and denote by ~˜P = H(~P )
the m(T − 2)× 1 vector of updated variables.
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4. Define the root-finding problem asG(~P ) = ~P−H(~P ). Since T is large, this
problem is substantially larger and we use the Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton
algorithm suggested in Ludwig (2005a) to form and update guesses of an
approximate Jacobi matrix of the system ofm(T−2) non-linear equations.
B.3 Calibration of Structural Model Parameters
Calibration of structural model parameters is based on a procedure suggested
in Ludwig (2005b). We split the r × 1 vector of structural model parameters,
~Ψ, as ~Ψ =
h
(~Ψe)0, (~Ψf )0
i0
. ~Ψf is a vector of predetermined (fixed) parameters,
whereas the e × 1 vector ~Ψe is estimated by minimum distance (unconditional
matching of moments using e moment conditions). Denote by
ut(~Ψ
e) = yt − f(~Ψe) for t = 0, . . . , T0
the GMM error as the distance between data, yt, and model simulated (pre-
dicted) values, f(~Ψe).
Under the assumption that the model is correctly specified, the restrictions
on the GMM error can be written as
E[ut(~Ψe0)] = 0,
where Ψ˜e0 denotes the vector of true values. Denote the sample averages of ut
as
gT0(~Ψ
e) ≡ 1
T0 + 1
T0X
t=0
ut(~Ψ
e). (18)
We estimate the elements of ~Ψe by setting these sample averages to zero (up to
some tolerance level).
In our economic model, the vector ~Ψe is given by
~Ψe = [g, δ,α, Zi, . . . , ZI ,β,ωi, . . . ,ωI ]
0 .
We estimate the structural model parameters using data from various sources
for the period 1950, ..., 2004, hence T0 = 54. To identify the structural model
parameters of the production function, g, δ,α, we use NIPA data for the U.S.
on GDP, fixed assets, depreciation, wages and labor supply. Since our economic
model restricts the capital-output ratio to be equal across countries, we restric
Z1 = 1 and can estimate Zi for i > 1 using data on labor productivity of
country i relative to the U.S.. The remaining structural model parameters,
β,ωi, . . . ,ωI , are estimated by simulation. We estimate β by setting to zero the
average distance between the simulated and the actual capital-output ratio and
ωi, . . . ,ωI by setting to zero the average distance between simulated and actual
average hours worked.
The predetermined parameter of our model is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, σ, which we set to one. In addition, we impose the restriction that the
parameters, α, δ, g,β,σ, are constant across countries.
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